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Abstract: 
This paper seeks to answer the call for more empirical research into the effects of trust in buyer- 
supplier relations. Using qualitative, survey and accounting data collected during a 2 year 
research project with a medium-sized German electrical component manufacturing firm, I explore 
what drives positive trust assessments on both sides of the firm's customer and supplier relations, 
as well as how the firm's sales team members and their customers define trust and understand its 
formation and impact. In this paper I also directly examine how the sales team members' positive 
assessments of customer trustworthiness independently acts to reduce the prices charged to those 
customers. 
"It is too easy to call one form of exchange economic, and another social. 
In real life, all types are both economic and social." 
(Braudel 1985:227) 
Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed an explosion in research and literature on the importance of 
trust in economic exchange relations. Growing literatures on interfmn alliances, joint 
ventures and industrial districts all spotlight trust as playing a central role in the forming and 
maintaining of close trading relations (Gambetta 1988; Gerlach 1992; Krarner and Tyler 
1996; Sabel 1993). These close relations facilitated by trust between economic actors are 
argued to reduce transaction costs (Sako 1992; Barney and Hansen 1994), facilitate 
mutually beneficial investments (Asanuma 1989; Dyer 1996), and improve coordination 
between firms (Fruin 1992; Nishiguchi 1994). Strategy researchers have gone perhaps 
farthest by suggesting that trust can be an important source of competitive advantage @yer 
and Ouchi 1993; Barney and Hansen 1994; Dyer 1996). Indeed, it has even been suggested 
that international differences in productivity and efficiency are related to difTerences in 
institutional trust between specific national cultures (Fukuyama 1995; Hill 1995; North 
1990). These studies as well as a vast number of articles in the popular business press have 
called upon firms to learn from these examples and work to build closer, more trusting 
relations with their customers and suppliers. To assist firms in the formation of trusting 
relations as well as to help them understand why they should be extending themselves in the 
effort, these researchers have sent out the call for more research into the causes and effects 
of trust in interfirm relations. 
However, as Oliver Williamson (1993) has noted, trust is a word with many meanings and 
uses in current research on organizations. As a new institutional economist who is critical 
of, but works within, the dominant economic model, Williamson maintains that trust is best 
understood as the result of contractual and legal safeguards, as well as credible threats such 
as the withdrawal of future business, which hem in opportunistic behavior. The resulting 
trust one has of one's trading partners is a calculative or contractual trust; actor A trusts 
that actor B will act in actor B's best interests, and due to the existence of counter- 
balancing negative sanctions, not attempt to take advantage of actor A's vulnerability (Hill 
1990; Williamson 1983, 1993). 
In contrast to Williamson's "calculative trust," Charles Sabel argues that trust is the "mutual 
confidence," held by actors that especially in the absence of rational self-interested grounds, 
"no party to an exchange will exploit the other's vulnerability.. ." (1993, p. 1 133) This 
definition has been called "goodwill" or "relational trust," to distinguish it from process- 
based trust (Zucker 1986; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995), competence trust (Sako 1992), 
institutional trust (Arrow 1974), and of course, calculative trust (Williamson 1993). Sabel 
is concerned with understanding trust as a symmetric aspect of relations and in exploring 
how this mutual trust affects the economic activity the exchange partners conduct, by for 
example enabling transactions which would be prohibited in the absence of mutual trust. 
Contrary to what Sabel suggests, I see no reason why trust has to be mutual. What is 
interesting to me is how social ties help trust to form and how this trust in turn affects and 
thus predicts the behavior of actors in the market. Thus what is important for my research 
is the subjectively held belief that actors have about the trustworthiness of others. In this I 
hold Sabe17s general definition with a small refinement; I define trust as the degree of 
confidence which actor A has of actor B, that actor B will not exploit the vulnerabilities of 
actor A. And I argue that this confidence on the part of actor A has concrete benefits for 
actor B in the form of preferential treatment. If people trust you, it positively affects the 
way they treat you (Frank 1988). This is the power of trust. To quote the cartoon 
character Dogbert, "Trust is an excellent quality for other people to have."' 
Among scholars of organizations there are substantial differences of opinion as to the 
impact of trust on economic exchange. For researchers working in the rational choice 
framework, the problem with trust as a basis for action is that the trustworthiness of a 
trading partner is difficult to establish with any meaninal degree of accuracy. Likewise 
they argue, trust is a very dscult  variable to operationalize. In the absence of reliable 
measures of tmst, contractual and legal safeguards (governance structures) have been 
suggested as the rational response to the predictable self-seeking and deceptive behavior of 
trading partners (Arrow 1974, Williamson 1985). Researchers utilizing a sociological or a 
' Dogbert is a character in Scott Adams' comic strip, Dilbert O 1996 United Features Syndicate, Inc. 
(NYC). This quote comes from a strip dated 9-9-96. 
psychological approach have directly attacked this model of economic man, the rational 
self-seeking and inherently untrustworthy individual. These researchers have argued that 
this overly calculative, rationally self-interested model of human behavior leads to over- 
investment in governance structures and even that it is morally suspect (Granovetter 1985, 
1992; Etzioni, 1 988; Donaldson, 1 990; Donaldson and Davis, 199 1 ; Mahoney, Huff and 
Huff, 1993). Granovetter argues simply that people exhibit non-self-interested behavior in 
their exchange relations much more frequently than would be suggested by a purely rational 
model, and what we should be turning our attention to is haw economic actors are affected 
by the structures of social relations in which they are embedded. 
As I see it, one way to study the effects of structural embeddedness and the effects of trust 
in the marketplace is to look first at the formation of trust between trading partners, and 
follow that by modeling trust as a source of competitive advantage. If it can be shown that 
the trust buyers and suppliers develop for each other reduces their use of costly governance 
structures, (rather than requiring such structures,) and that these relations have a 
.measurable impact on supplier selection and price formation, this would be a significant step 
forward. In this effort it is essential that the actors themselves are interviewed, to explore 
how they understand trust, and what if any role they see trust playing in their relations. 
In my research I am exploring the links between social structure and economic behavior in 
buyer-supplier relations. In my research design, social structure is evidenced through the 
personal relations maintained between employees in customer (buyer) firms and employees 
in selling (supplier) firms. I theorize that these ties are actively constituted by people 
embedded in social relations which shape their roles and behavior, and I hypothesize that 
these ties have an independent effect on economic activity. Specifically, I argue that these 
personal relations which constitute the organizational ties between buyer and supplier firms 
are the basis of trust between those actors and between their h s .  Furthermore, 
independent of other economic effects, I argue that this trust affects supplier selection and 
"make or buy" decisions on the buyer's side of the relation, and price formation on the 
supplier's side of the relation. By showing that trust can have the ability to reduce the need 
for costly governance structures, and have an independent effect on price formation, I aim 
to show that trust can be a source of competitive advantage. 
In sum, my research goals with this line of inquiry are to explore: 1 .) how the type and 
nature of ties between firms affects the formation of trust between those firms; 2.) how trust 
affects a range of firm behaviors, specifically trust's impact on price formation; 3.) the 
extent to which trusting relations are purposively created and manipulated by firm 
managers; and 4.) how trust and its impact on economic behavior are understood by firm 
managers. In this way I hope to add to our understanding of the causes and effects of trust 
in buyer-supplier relations. This is the agenda to which my research is dedicated. In this 
paper I focus specifically on point number (2) above, and explore the impact a salesman's 
assessment .of the trustworthiness of hislher customers has on the prices charged to those 
customers. 
Sociology of organizations 
For sociologists, economic transactions, whether between individuals or firms, are human 
interactions involving people located in structures of social relations. However, in 
neoclassical economic literature these relations are most often theorized as market 
transactions, governed by rules of rationality and maximization. In terms of influence, 
networks of economic actors engaged in repetitive economic transactions are seen as 
disconnected groups of atomistic actors. However, in terms of information flows, these 
same actors are seen as a complete network of fblly connected actors with no variation in 
connectivity with equal access to untainted and complete information. This continues in 
spite of the fact that network ties and information asymmetries have been shown to affect a 
wide range of individual behaviors.* 
In recent years, new institutional economics has emerged as one attempt by economists to 
place the interpersonal human relations squarely into the rather lifeless economic model. By 
considering that actors engaged in economic transactions often come into repeated personal 
contact, theorists such as Oliver Williamson have inserted a feedback loop into the 
neoclassical model in which producers and consumers begin to tailor their behavior, 
products, and needs to fit their relations. This feedback loop has serious implications for 
the market as theorized in neoclassical economic theory. For how can we assume perfect 
competition, even as a theory, if we have customers and suppliers making investments in 
- -  - - 
* See Mizruchi 1994 for a review of literature on network affects. 
specific trading relations, in effect erecting trade barriers which gum up the market 
mechanism? However, one problem that the new institutional economics shares with 
neoclassical theory is that both approaches, when they talk about social structure at all, 
conceptualize it as an eflect of economic  transaction^.^ In contrast, organizational research 
in resource dependence, institutional theory, and network analysis has argued the reverse, 
that the social structure of relations between actors has an active role in the shaping of 
economic activity. This difference is due in part to the assumption that sociologists make 
that the preference curves of actors are not fixed and exogenous, and economic behavior is 
guided by more than a individual level drive for profit maximization. Economic actors are 
driven by desires more complex than short term maximization, among the most prominent 
of which are self-respect, power and prestige. And, as Granovetter (1985) has argued, 
economic actors are not immune to the immediate influences of the social interactions they 
are involved in. Actors do not engage in economic exchange merely to satisfl existent 
desires, their economic transactions are occurring in the context of ongoing social relations 
which directly influence their preference curves, give meaning to what being "economical" 
means, and fiame both success and failure. As the interactions themselves come to have 
meaning for the actors involved, prior interactions and transactions with the other actors 
affect their &re choices. 
In the last two decades the resource dependence model has been one of the dominant 
models guiding sociological research on organizations. This model has roots in earlier 
work, but is most closely associated with the 1978 work of Pfeffer and Salancik. The 
model as outlined by Pfeffer and Salancik holds that firms operate in perilous and ever- 
changing contexts which are governed.largely by factors beyond the direct control of the 
firm's managers. Because firms are dependent on access to resources that they can not 
themselves provide, the firm is thus dependent upon its environment. Consequently, a firm's 
effectiveness in staying in successfbl operation is dependent upon its managers' ability to 
consistently extract the needed resources fiom its environment. 
Following the logic of the resource dependence perspective, many researchers have argued 
that firms seek to establish corporate board interlocks to co-opt other firms in an effort to 
establish and influence over h s  which control needed resources, in order to facilitate 
access to those resources (Pennings 1980; Burt 1983; Mizruchi 1982, 1987; Mizruchi and 
3 However, the work of new institutional economist Douglass North is one notable exception. 
Stearns 1988). However as Mizruchi and others have pointed out, "it is often unclear 
whether an interlock involves the co-optation of firm A by firm B or the infiltration of firm 
B by firm A" (Mumchi, 1992 p. 65). In spite of this difficulty, the list of persuasive 
research conducted in this vein is impressive. 
Granovetter and Embeddedness: 
For years the sociologist's critique of economics rested on the complaint that economics 
ignored the internalized norms which sociologists held central to addressing the problem of 
social order, and the need for social approval through adhering to the norms of membership 
in a social group. Classical economists explained social order as the outgrowth of the 
invisible hand, while many sociologists came to explain order as framed by internalized 
norms of social life, learned during childhood and supported throughout life. This came to 
be what Wrong (1961) identified as the problem in sociology of the "over-socialized" 
conception of human behavior. 
The irony in this debate between the over-socialized and the under-socialized views of 
human behavior is, as Granovetter has indicated, that these two perspectives agree on the 
insulation of actors and their preference structures from the influences of the immediate 
social context (Granovetter 1985, p.485). The specific content or history of the relations 
which actors are party to do not matter, because there are over-arching considerations of 
either self-interest or adherence to socially prescribed role relations to guide behavior. 
While these perspectives may have-made abstracting from a small sample theoretically 
tenable, they downplayed the degree to which actors' "attempts at purposive action are. .. 
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations" (ibid., p. 487). Uzzi (1992) and 
Nishigushi (1994) have shown how actors in turn shape these relations strategically. 
Granovetter's solution suggests that we don't need recourse to internalized norms or 
enlightened self-interest to explain social order. The human relations which frame economic 
behavior are constantly (re)creating the order which facilitates the transactions. These 
human relations are not mere leftovers of some more primitive state, they are the 
mechanism through which order is p~ssible.~ They may impede "perfect" competition, as 
Adam Smith laments in his famous passage, "people of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices" (Smith [I7761 1979 pp. 232-3). 
But they facilitate competition and cooperation in markets fraught with incomplete 
information and unclear risks such as the risk faced in expenditures on research and 
development (Powell 1990). The embeddedness perspective calls upon us to study the 
actual relations, the concrete patterns of those relations, if we wish to'understand human 
economic behavior in a given context. The fbndamental insight of the embeddedness 
concept is that no economic transaction occurs in a social vacuum. The challenge lies in 
capturing the social structure involved in economic transactions in order to subject it to 
systematic study. 
Buyer-Supplier Trust and the Japanese: 
Probably no other application of the argument for the significance of trust has garnered 
more attention than the differences between the US and Japanese auto industry. In the past 
two decades there has been a wave of articles and books in the business press espousing the 
virtues of what has come to be called the Japanese model of supplier relations. Limiting its 
focus nearly always to the differences between Japanese and American buyer-supplier 
relations in the automotive industry, this literature argues that the management of interfirm 
business relations between suppliers and customers is the key to fbture international 
competitiveness (Womack et. al. 1992; Hirst and Zeitlin 1989; Dertouzos et. al. 1989). In 
this literature the West is described as losing out to the Japanese because Japan has closer, 
less competitive, and more trusting relations between buyers and suppliers. The "Toyota 
model," as this mode of industrial organization has been called, stresses deeply embedded, 
long standing relationships between customer and supplier firms. These ties mean that 
many supplier firms have fewer than five customers, and often only one. There are 
divisions, however, among those authors who utilize this general approach. Some stress the 
economic efficiency of the Toyota model, while others stress the unfair trade practices 
resulting from closed markets. 
- -- 
4 For example, Polanyi ( 1  944) argued for a high degree of embeddedness (evidenced as kinship obligations) 
in primitive societies giving way to more pure market logic with economic development. 
The economic efficiency argument holds that the Toyota model of deeply embedded 
relations is more flexible and thus more effective at responding to today's market pressures. 
In the modem volatile market, the speed by which a new car or computer can go from 
conception to customer is seen as the keystone of competitiveness. Studies have shown 
that the Toyota model of close relations reduces haggling between buyer firms and their 
component suppliers and assembly sub-contractors, and thus decreases the response time of 
the entire sector. This stands in contrast to the prevailing model of Western manufacturing 
in which sub-contractors and component suppliers are contacted on a bidding basis by 
customers who have blueprints in hand. The resulting contracting and competitive 
pressures, which are believed by the central firms to be guaranteeing them the lowest prices, 
are in fact slowing down their production and breeding a culture of distrust and 
malfeasance. 
This literature was not without weaknesses. Quite problematic is that component 
manufacture is very often not properly distinguished from sub-contracting work. Sub- 
contractors are typically assembly houses or "job shops" which carry out flexible Cut-Make- 
Trim (CMT) contracting such as printed circuit board (PCB) assembly in the electronics 
industry, engine block casting in the automobile industry, or pattern cutting and sewing in 
the garment industry. In these cases, the supplier maintains little of the expertise associated 
with design or production, and is more or less a flexible labor force for the central firm 
which both designs and assembles the final product. In addition, because wages in the 
supplier firms have been characteristically significantly lower than the core firms 
internationally, has led some researchers to suggest that these smaller subcontractors are 
better seen as a flexible labor pool rather than independent companies. 
In contrast, some components must be designed-in to the final product, and the component 
supplier in this case has expertise which the buyer lacks. Other components have standard 
forms, and can be ordered from suppliers "off-the-shelf." The third possibility is that 
components are designed by the buyer, who approaches suppliers with blueprints in hand, 
seeking bids. In the auto industry, most of the technology and design is held by the central 
assembler firms. The relationship of most component suppliers is thus sub-contracting. 
This does not characterize the electrical appliance industry nor many other industries in 
Japan (Asanuma 1989). Finally, the Japanese are moving away from the real paternalism 
that worked during unbridled growth period of the post war period (Sako 1992, p. 55). In 
these times of economic downturn, the parent-child language of buyer-supplier relations in 
Japan is giving way to a language of equal partners due to a lack of desire among the 
central buyer firms to shoulder the responsibility for their suppliers and sub-contractors 
(Keller 1 994). 
The most obvious weakness of this literature, however, stems from the fact that it focuses 
nearly exclusively on the auto industry. This is not surprising, as the strongest differences 
between Japan and the West are to be found in the organization of automobile production. 
But studies have shown that other Japanese firms do not follow the example of the auto 
industry. Asanuma (1989) has shown that in the electrical appliance industry relationships 
are quite heterogeneous, relations between firms are more equal, and pure sub-contracting 
is much rarer. But the weaknesses of this literature aside, the point at hand is that trust is 
conceived of by many researchers as a source of competitive advantage due to trust's ability 
to reduce the need for costly governance structures. The result is that trust is economically 
more efficient for those actors who have it in their buyer-supplier relations. 
In addition to reducing the need for costly governance structures, trust has also been argued 
to increase the palette of possible exchange opportunities available to individuals and firms 
(Zajac and Olsen 1993; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). It has been noted, for example, that 
some transactions involve such high degrees of exchange vulnerabilities that no governance 
structure could create the necessary trust (Grossman and Hart 1986). In these cases, 
exchange partners who have high levels of trust for each other are in a position to take 
advantage of opportunities in the market that are off limits to partners who do not have 
trust between them. 
At this juncture it is important to take a moment to talk about Williamson's understanding 
of trust. Trust, Williamson argues, is the belief that your trading partner will not exploit 
your vulnerabilities, and is created by the governance structures you set up to prevent it. 
Thus for example, if sufficient costs to breach of contract have been erected through 
contracting, laws or ownership structures, the calculating actor feels confident that hisher 
vulnerabilities will not be exploited by rational trading partners, and can be said to "trust'' 
them (Williamson, 1993). 
That personally internalized values against self-interested behavior and extra-monetary 
benefits often inhibit the extraction of relational rents is admitted by Williamson (1993). He 
argues however, that the likelihood a person will act opportunistically in a specific 
transaction is an aspect of the corporate, network, professional and the wider societal, 
culture that person and firm are a part of Culture, as Williamson explains, "applies to large 
groups, sometimes an entire society, and involves very low levels of intentionality.. . The 
main import of culture, for purposes of economic organization, is that it serves as a check 
on opportunism" (1993 p. 476) Knowable, these cultural effects are aspects of the 
environment the boundedly rational actor takes into account, to the degree circumscribed by 
the limits of their rational abilities, when costing out the contractual hazards involved in a 
transaction. 
Summary of my position 
While much research has shown that networks of interfirm relations affect firm behavior, 
what remains largely unspecified in organizational research, as Nohria and Eccles have 
pointed out, is how the content and nature of these relations affect the meaning of the tie for 
the firms involved (1 992, p. 12- 14). Coming from a network-embeddedness approach that 
does not discount entirely the insights fiom the new institutional economics school, I am 
interested in exploring how, concretely, social relations between firms affect firm behavior. 
More specifically, my research is aimed at understanding how trust is formed between the 
individuals who make up the interfirm relations between buyer and supplier firms, how this 
trust is understood by those actors, and what effect this trust has on firm behavior, 
specifically how it affects supplier selection on the part of the buyer, and price formation on 
the part of the supplier. 
The Research Study 
To study these issues, I contracted with German Components (GC,)' an electrical 
components manufacturing firm headquartered in Germany, to study the effects various 
types of customer and supplier relations have on trust, customer satisfaction, and their 
bottom line. I selected this company because it has extensive sales operations in Germany, 
I refer to the company by this pseudonym to maintain the firm's anonymity. 
the US, and Japan, facilitating a &re cross-national comparison, and it is a good example 
of Germany's powehl  Mittelstand, the strata of middle-sized firms which are the backbone 
of Germany's economic power. For a Mittelstand firm, GC is nearly the definition. GC 
exports about 50% of its product, is the world leader in its field of specialty, employs 
approximately 2500 people, and has sales of about $250 million per year.6 GC 
manufactures electrical and electronic components for the automotive, aircraft, consumer 
electronics, medical and process control equipment industries, and its customers include 
most of the world leaders in these fields. Although the firm was selected due in part to the 
possibility of a cross-national comparison of the effects under study, the data analyzed for 
this paper deal exclusively with the firm's relations with its German customers. 
This research required eighteen months to complete and included both face-to-face 
interviews and a mail survey. .The interviews were conducted during April and May of 
1995, and the survey was mailed out in September of 1995. The sales transactions under 
study are those made during the calendar year 1995. The interview portion of my research 
involved conducting open-ended interviews with both sides of a stratified sample of 30 of 
the firm's customer firms, and 20 of the its supplier firms. For the customer firms this 
meant interviewing both the purchasing manager at the customer firm responsible for the 
relation with GC and the sales engineer at GC responsible for the relation with the customer 
firm. *In all cases these people were personally acquainted with one another. All interviews 
were conducted at the subject's office, in German. I followed this up with a survey sent to 
all'of the firm's remaining German corporate customers (n=489). For each customer 
relationship I typically interviewed (or later surveyed) the purchasing manager in charge of 
the relationship with GC, and followed. this up with an interview (or survey) with. the. lead. 
sales engineer(s) responsible for the firm's relationship with the customer. In addition, I 
obtained from GC's accounting department a list of product sold, price obtained, and 
variable production costs. From the Development department I obtained a measurement of 
sunk costs, represented by a 7-point Likert scale measure of the degree of customer specific 
applications engineering effort included in each product sold. Ln total I obtained complete 
(survey and accounting) data on 227 of GC's 5 19 German corporate customer relations, 
including complete price and variable cost data on all 2588 sales transactions these 
customers made with GC during 1995. 
6 The definition of a Mittelstand firm comes from Hermann Simon, the man who literally wrote the book on 
the Mittlestand firm, Die heimlichen Gewinner (The Hidden Champions). 
Some particulars of the case: 
Founded in 1947, GC manufactures electrical components for industrial clients. None of 
the firm's sales are retail. The company currently has 30,000 active part numbers, and more 
than 2,500 customers world-wide, the largest of which represents 3.4% of total sales. The 
firm is involved in strategic partnerships for product development with some of its larger 
customers, but these relations constitute only about 5% of the company's sales. The entire 
sales staff of the company numbers only 100 people, with an average of 25 customers to a 
sales agent. The company produces most of its products Germany, but has additional 
plants in Malta and Malaysia, and conducts some final assembly at the point of sale at its 
American, British, and Japanese profit centers. The company has well-established wholly 
owned profit centers in the USA, England and Japan, which have been operating for more 
than 25 years. In addition, the company has small and much more recently established 
profit centers in Belgium, Italy, and France. Sales outside of Germany total half of the 
firm's production. 
Firm managers are adamant that GC is not a sub-contractor, it is a design house. While 
hlly designed-in custom products constitute only 20% of the firm's sales, hlly 45% of sales 
involve a non-trivial amount of customer application engineering effort. The remaining 
55% are made to order fiom standard catalog specifications. About half of the firm's sales 
are inspected upon delivery, and half are ship-to-stock (JIT). Firm managers attribute this 
low degree of inspection as much to the firm's reputation as its participation in Europe's 
new IS0  9000 quality control program. On-site visits from customers, which are common 
in Japanese component supply firms, are rare for GC. The few that do occur are usually 
from larger clients who want to inspect the quality control measures used on the shop floor. 
Results 
How is trust formed? 
Immediately at the outset of the interview portion of my research I found tremendous 
interest for my topic on the. part of the purchasing managers and sales engineers I sought to 
interview. Expecting a low favorable response rate to my request for a one-hour interview, 
I initially contacted a random sample of 100 of GC7s customer firms. My acceptance rate 
with only a contact letter and some follow-up phone calls was over 60% and I had to turn 
down many interviews for lack of time and travel money. It is clear to me that to the people 
who constitute the ties we refer to in our research as interfirm relations, trust is a variable 
they are very interested in discussing. 
The interviews I conducted with the buyers and sales team members for this research 
project were a rich source of data on the nature, formation and importance of trust, as well 
as German business practices and cultural norms in general. For the present purposes 
however, I will focus on the subjects' responses to my inquiries regarding the formation and 
purposes of trust. After the first few open-ended interviews I settled on a definition of trust 
I wanted to talk about and in the subsequent interviews this definition was not a discussion 
item. This was because I wanted to deflect the discussion away from rather tirne- 
consuming discussions of "what is trust?" to the more interesting, "how is trust formed?" 
To this end I defined trust for my respondents as the degree of certainty an actor has that a 
tradingpartner will not exploit hisher@rm's vulnerabilities. In general I found my 
subjects very supportive of this working definition. 
Inquiring into how the trustworthiness of trading partners is ascertained was by far the most 
challenging and interesting part of the interview. More often than not my subjects had to 
think long before answering. My research assistants and I had to work hard to resist the 
urge to say something during what were often embarrassing protracted silences, but the 
effort paid off In addition I probed the subjects to tell stories, to give substance to their 
impressions as to the bases of trust. In this way I was able to gain what I think is a fairly 
nuanced understanding of how my subjects understand the creation of trustworthiness. 
In coding the data I have identified three basic understandings of the bases of trust. This is 
to say that the responses from my subjects on the subject of how trustworthiness is 
determined, although coming from purchasing and sales stamembers disparate in their 
age, educational background, sex and years of job experience, can be categorized into three 
basic groups which I call 1 .) trust at first sight, 2.) trust as an unbroken chain of promises, 
and 3.) trust as revealed only in crisis. 
Category 1: Trust at First Sight: 
A significant portion of the respondents claim that they can tell the trustworthiness of 
trading partners at first sight (7 out of 30 of the customer representatives and 5 out of 20 of 
the supplier representatives interviewed). Said one customer, the CEO of a small 
manufacturing firm located in south Germany, "You sit across the table from them; you feel 
it. I look them in the eye too, that helps. You can just see it in the way they treat you, how 
much they pay attention to your ideas, your thoughts, you see right away where you are in 
their agenda and how you fit in."' Several respondents echoed the words of the purchasing 
manager at a large auto manufacturer who explained, "It's like immediate chemistry, either 
it's there or it's not." Another man, a purchasing manager with a large multi-national 
photographic chemicals firm explained it this way, "I have simply never been wrong. I have 
the intuition. This is one reason I am better at this job than a lot of other people. I can just 
tell if a supplier is going to one of those who will just lead you around by the nose (an der 
Nase herumfiren). It's an art you simply have to learn to be good at this job." At a loss 
for another way to explain it, one woman, a purchasing manager at a middle-sized consumer 
appliance firm just said, "It's Sympathie, when you feel it, you just know it." 
Category 2: Trust as an Unbroken Chain of Performance: 
The largest group of respondents explain the formation of trust as the cumulative effect of a 
long period of doing business without any problems (13 out of 30 of the customer 
representatives and 7 out of 20 of the supplier representatives interviewed). To these 
respondents the only way to ascertain trust with any meaningfbl degree of accuracy is to 
infer it from the unbroken series of deals. History is the teacher in this conception of trust 
formation. As one respondent, a purchasing manager at a truck and bus manufacturing 
subsidiary of a large auto company, explained, 'When it's been a few years, then we can 
talk about trust. When I have seen the track record, the list of deliveries there on time, then 
we can talk about trust." Another respondent, a salesman at a fine metals supply firm had a 
different way of explaining this, 'The best customers, they are the one's I've been dealing 
with for years, lots of product sold and whose names I don't even know. When they have 
been getting their [product], and not bothering me with ridiculous demands to reduce 
prices, or threatening me with competition, that's what I call a trustworthy customer." One 
respondent, a purchasing manager at a large photo chemical firm said it this way, "I start 
7 Abbreviated Interview Transcription (AIT) 23, line 327 
out with high hopes for each supplier. You could say I trust them all, but not a lot, I'm a 
little guarded. Then over time we see how things go, we watch the supplier, and we keep 
records. When several years have gone by, say 7 or 8 and there have been no significant 
problems, then we discuss moving them into our preferred supplier pool. But if they mess 
things up, by for example making promises they can't or don't want to fulfill, then we take 
them out of that pool and send them right back to the bottom again." 
Category 3: Trust as Revealed Only in Crisis: 
The third category of explanation of trust formation described by my informants involves 
trust assessments as the result of crises (8 out of 30 of the customer representatives and 6 
out of 20 of the supplier representatives interviewed). These informants explain that, 'you 
can't tell what a man's made of until the problem's start." One subject, a purchasing 
manager at a large injection molding £inn used the following rather colorhl 
imagery, "In this business I may think I can tell the rats from the mice, but you know its not 
until the cheese spills out that we actually know which one's which ... Sometimes I think 
what makes it so hard is that the sales reps don't know themselves if they are rats or mice. 
Then something goes wrong, and we both find out." To informants like this man, what is 
key to coming to a positive trust assessment is the experience of working through a problem 
with a customer or a supplier. As one older salesman from a circuit breaker manufacturer 
explained, 'Maybe my customer will get a low-ball bid, maybe the competitor has gotten 
my spec sheet from somebody inside of his [the customer's] firm, and then I know what 
kind of relationship we have. If it's a few pennies and the guy throws me out or worse, 
brings me under heavy pressure to let him have the difference, then I know, he just can't be 
trusted." A purchasing manager from a weapons system manufacturing firm explained it 
this way, "Some of the people we deal with, they are just fine until a problem occurs. Then 
they just can't deal with it. Something comes up, the product isn't on my loading dock, or 
it won't do what they said it would do, whatever, and instead of dealing with it, they don't 
want to accept responsibility for the problem. And I just can't bear that." 
Who Holds Which Views of Trust? 
In exploring who holds which view of trust, I have so far uncovered two interesting 
relationships in the data. The &st of these relationships is that respondents in the last 
category described above, trust revealed in crisis, have a higher number of years on the job 
in comparison to the other two groups (see table la, below.) This suggests that experience . 
plays a role in encouraging the subjects in my study to believe that trust is revealed only in 
crisis. In addition, the subjects in category (2) above, trust revealed over time, were more 
likely than subjects in the other two groups to have a business rather than a technical degree 
see table lb, below.) This suggests that German business schools could be teaching their 
students either a.) that trust derives from performance, or b.) a general rational calculus that 
supports this perspective. As a final note, no relationship was found between these 
perspectives on trust formation and either industry or firm size. 
Table la: Educational Background and View of Trust 
Education 
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50 (1 00%) 
pc.0001 
0 -  15 
15 (33%) 
20 (43%) 
Transaction cost economics contends that long-term relations involving significant amounts 
of supplier-provided technology facilitate the exacting of economic rents by the suppler 
from the buyer. In other words, the asset specificity the supplier has on the buyer allows 
the supplier to charge the buyer prices which are a distortion from a competitive market 
price (Aoki 1988; Walker and Poppo 199 1). Aoki (1 988) called these, "relational quasi- 
rents" and predicts them to be associated with close relations between buyer and seller. 
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the trading relation if favorable prices are not extended. In the presence of supplier- 
provided technology however, most often in the form of customer-specific applications 
engineering and product design, this threat is not credible since the buyer has limited access 
to other sources. Following this logic, Asanuma (1989) has suggested that asset specificity, 
measured by the amount of customer specific applications engineering effort, contributes to 
the extraction of economic rents. In this way Asanuma is following the logic of both 
Williamson and Aoki, both of whom argue that firms that contribute to the design of a 
component will gain a higher profit margins than if they are merely sub-contractors (Aoki 
1988; Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
The logic of transaction cost theory in this regard is compelling. For example, firms who 
have "captured" a customer with asset specific investments in applications engineering 
would have little incentive to reduce prices as production costs drop over time due to 
learning curve effects. A network embeddedness approach, however, suggests that this 
needn't be the case. As Granovetter and others have argued, firms in long-term, deeply 
embedded relations, may well be less inclined to take advantage of those relations. 
As one attempt to resolve this debate, Okun (1 98 1) argues that prices are set by a 
combination of social and supply-demand concerns and introduces the idea of "auction 
market" prices and "customer market prices." He argues that customer market prices are 
prices that are influenced by the social relationship between the buyer and the seller, and 
that these are the most common. Okun sees these social effects in terms of transaction cost 
minimization. He explains, "customers avoid shopping costs by sticking with their supplier 
much as workers avoid search costs by sticking with their employer." (Okun, 1981. p 142) 
But for Granovetter (1990, 1993) and others working in an embeddedness framework, it is 
not just that the social relations can facilitate a transaction cost reducing calculus. The 
point is that these relations may well reduce actors' inclination to take advantage of the 
opportunities for profit maximizing that the economic relation create. Although I would 
agree that asset specificity, as evidenced by high levels of applications technology, will put 
upward pressure on prices, I would also argue that the presence of high levels of trust on 
the part of the sales engineers in charge of those relations, will predict a reduction in price.' 
I therefore reasoned that, 
* It could be argued that high trust assessments of the customer for the sales engineer would put upward 
pressure on prices, and I have not addressed this issue directly in the current research. This would involve 
Hypothesis One: 
The supplier's positive trustworthiness assessment of the customer will have a 
sigruficant and independent downward influence upon the prices charged to that 
customer. 
Similarly, I expect that trust will mitigate other self-interested behavior, namely the use of 
ever more detailed contracts in the presence of asset specificity. About 20% of the GC's 
sales involve the use of detailed contracts, which my i n t e ~ e w  data suggests is comparable 
with general trends in the industry. Important in this regard however, is that the use of 
contracts is significantly more common in relations with aircraft manufactures due to legal 
considerations involving product liability. However, considering the extent of GC's 
customer specific investments the firm doesn't use detailed contracting very often at all. 
GC's export sales manager echoed the findings of Stewart Macaulay (1963) when he said, 
only half in jest, "Contracts? We don't need contracts; our policy is to deliver on what we 
say we will do, period." 
Williamson (1991) however, argues that contracts are essential in governing relations, and 
that they facilitate the formation of trust. While Dore (1983) has supported Macaulay's 
findings in suggesting that contracts are relatively uncommon and unimportant for business, 
Sako (1992, p. 97) has gone hrther and suggested that the mere presence of a contract may 
in fact provoke conflict between trading partners because it assumes di~trust.~ Although I 
agree with Williamson that as asset specificity rises we can expect the use of contracts to 
increase, I expect that, 
Hypothesis Two: 
- - 
turning our attention to the effect on an actor's behavior of their perception of trustworthiness assessments 
others have made of them. I aim to begin to address this issue in my further research. 
Macaulay alludes to this relationship possible between contracts and trust as well. 
There will be an inverse relationship between trading partners7 trustworthiness 
assessments of each other and the use of contracts. 
The formation of trust: 
What contributes to the formations of trust between economic actors? Under what 
conditions does an actor increase hisher assessment of the trustworthiness of trading 
partners? There are no doubt several components of this dynamic, some of which are more 
challenging to measure than others, but two components I argue contribute significantly to 
the creation of trust are, 1 .) how long the two companies have been doing business together 
or the length of the inter* relation, and 2. )  how long the two main contact people whose 
personal relation constitutes the interfirm relation have known each other, or the length of 
the personal relation. However, I believe that the length of the relation and the length of 
the personal relation should themselves predict lower prices. Thus I expect that, 
Hypothesis Three: 
3a.) The length of the interfirm relation and the length of the personal relation will 
predict high trustworthiness assessments on both sides of the relation, 
3b.) The length of the interfirm relation and the length of the personal relation will 
predict lower prices. 
Indicators 
Cost/Price Ratio (main dependent variable): This variable was calculated by summing the 
total of all the prices charged to each customer during the 1995 calendar year, and dividing 
- this total by the total variable costs of production of those products purchased as calculated 
by the h 7 s  cost accounting department. In this way I created a measure of the markup 
over the variable costs of production GC is charging its customers, which I use as a proxy 
for the rate of profit. This cost data used to develop this variable is the same as that used 
by firm managers in calculating prices. 
Type of contract used (dependent variable): GC uses three basic dserent contracts, coded 
as follows: 1 .) simple sales contracts similar to purchase orders, 2.) framing contracts re- 
negotiated on a yearly basis, and 3.) large, comprehensive multi-page documents that are 
often haggled over for months or even years. The presence and type of contract data were 
collected from GC's inland sales division. 
Degree of trust (key independent variable): In my interviews I asked questions designed to 
measure the degree of trust between the actors comprising the interfirm relation between 
GC and its customer firms companies, as well as the direction of that trust. After first 
defining what I mean by trust to the subject," I asked, 'Does this trust play a role in your 
business work?'Another question asked to what degree in general the respondent trusts 
the other actors they do business with. And finally I referred to their main contact person 
on the other side of the relation by name and asked, "to what degree do you trust this 
person?' For the quantitative analysis presented below, the trust variables were collected 
from a survey instrument what followed the same basic line of questioning. The 
respondents were given on a 5 point Likert scale with 5 representing the highest trust 
rating, and 1 being the lowest. 
Length of the inter-rm relation (LOFR) and Length of the personal relation (LOPR) 
(independent variables): These variables are recorded in days, with the interfirm variable 
taken from GC's record of each customer's first purchase, and the personal relation 
information taken from the surveys of the customers and the sales engineers. Where the 
two actors involved disagreed on the length of this relation, the mean of the two reported 
answers has been used. To control for skewness in these data, the natural log of these two 
variables are used in the analysis below. 
Customer Weighted Applications Technology (WAT) (proxy for Asset Specificity, key 
control variable): Using automobile design engineers Monteverde and Teece (1 982) 
classified automobile components according to the degree of applications engineering effort, 
to create an index of asset specificity. The authors hypothesized that the more important 
10 Trust as the degree of certianty an actor has that his trading partner would not exploit his firm's 
vulnerabilities. 
the applications engineering, the more likely the component's manufacturing was to be 
vertically integrated. Likewise, they used a dummy variable for "specific" to one car 
company, and "generic" if it was able to be sold to more than one firm, reasoning that the 
specific components were more likely to be integrated into the company. Asanuma (1989) 
likewise suggested that the degree to which the supplier is contributing to the design of the 
component can be reasonably argued to be a proxy for asset specificity. Similarly, I have 
created an index of asset specificity, developed using Asanuma's seven-stage scale, in which 
GC7s technical staff in production and product development rated each product's degree 
of customer specific applications engineering effort on a seven point scale. The more 
customer-specific design a product contained, the higher the rating. In the analysis 
presented below, the purchase price was used to weight the applications engineering effort 
in order to create a customer total weighted applications technology (WAT) variable. 
Total Customer Sales 1995 (control variable): Total sales is measured as the dollar amount 
of the all transactions with each customer in the 1995 calendar year. Due to the large 
variation found in this variable, the natural log of this variable is used in the analysis below. 
Table 2: Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Two-tailed tests * p < .05 ** p < .O1 
The Effects of Trust, Some Preliminary Results 
Trust and Sales Price: 
Table 2 above presents the means, standard deviations and correlations among the variables. 
The trust assessments made by the sales engineers of their customers (Trust-S) and the trust 
assessments made by the customers of the sales engineers at GC (Trust-C) are Likert scaled 
1-5 with 5 being the highest, and 1 being the lowest. 'The applications technology data that 
the transaction level is Likert scaled fiom 1-7 with 7 being the highest degree of 
applications technology, the customer's weighted applications technology (WAT) is a 
continuous variable with a range of 1 to 5.1. The price/cost ratio data is likewise 
continuous, with a minimum value of .785 and a maximum value of 2.837. Total sales, 
(Sales) is reported in dollars, and this variable has a minimum value of $2,652.30 and a 
maximum value of $3,448,135.70. This variable is highly skewed and a natural log 
transformation was used in the regression analysis below. The length of interfirm relation 
(LOFR) and length of personal relation (LOPR) are shown here in days. These variables 
are likewise sufficiently skewed to warrant the use of a natural log transformation in the 
regressions reported below. 
Table 3: Linear Regression Models, Dependent Variable = PriceICost Ratio 
Firm Size 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
.1749** .1877** .1630** 
(7.686) (-7.193) (7.653) 
-. 1137** -. 1169** -. 1023** 
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Table 3 presents the results of several multiple regression equations testing the hypotheses 
that trust has an independent effect on price formation. In the table, the raw regression 
coefficients are presented with the t-statistics in parenthesis. In equation one, as expected, 
weighted applications technology (WAT) is positive on the dependent variable p/c ratio 
while a customer's total purchases (total sales) is negative. This is expected because the 
weighted applications technology, whether seen in terms of sunk costs or in terms of asset 
specificity, should put upward pressure on prices. As sunk costs, they need to be 
recovered, and as asset specific investments they facilitate the extraction of economic rents 
in the form of higher prices. Also, greater sales volume (total sales) puts the expected 
downward pressure on prices due to volume discounts. 
In equation two I test the theory that the size of the customer firm would put downward 
pressure on the price/cost ratio and come up empty-handed. I find no eiidence here in the 
data that asymmetry of firm size in the dyadic relations between buyer and supplier has an 
effect on firm size. But it is in equation three that we get to the main effects under study. 
Here we see that as predicted, the findings support the hypothesis that favorable trust 
assessments by sales engineers for their customers puts downward pressure on the prices 
they charge those customers, even controlling for WAT and total sales effects. 
Some might argue that because the trust the sales team member has for the customer puts 
downward pressure on prices, the trust the customer has for the sales team member should 
put upward pressure on the prices charged. Equation 4 shows that the trust the customer 
has for the sales team member does not have this effect. To discuss why I believe this is the 
case requires me to explore in more detail possible reasons why lower prices might be 
extended when sales team members trust the customer representatives. First of all I argue 
that the economic benefits of closer relations accrue disproportionately to the supplier side 
of the relation, and extension of lower prices to the buyer by the supplier is the primary way 
the supplier reallocates a proportion of those benefits to the buyer. However, it is not just a 
irrational reward for good behavior, it is part of the implicit contract between the buyer and 
the supplier. Each has his side of the bargain to fulfill. For example, the buyer reduces the 
risk profile of the supplier through his assurances that his firm will stick with the supplier 
through the life of the model and that they will not put the supplier's proprietary design out 
- for competitive bid. If the supplier feels that the customer is trustworthy he responds with 
lower prices. 
Why does the supplier respond in this way? In my interviews, those subjects who argued 
that trust puts downward pressure on prices offered explanations that were both more and 
less rational. One common and more rational argument was that when suppliers believe that 
they are in a business relation for the long run and when they trust their customer, they 
respond by amortizing their fixed costs over a longer time horizon, which results in lower 
prices for the buyer in the short run. Another more rational argument offered was that 
suppliers simply want to hold onto those customer they trust, and lower prices are a rational 
way to hold customers. Less rational explanations argue either that suppliers reduce prices 
to reward the virtuous and punish the more cutthroat, or that lower prices are simply a way 
to reward your friends. Implied in all of these explanations is the idea that the supplier is 
the actor acting to reduce prices, and thus we do not expect to see higher prices when the 
customers trust the suppliers. 
In equations 5 through 8, we see what could be the most important finding. These 
equations show that contrary to hypothesis 3b, when controlling for trust, length of firm 
relation (LOFR) and length of personal relation, (LOPR) do not significantly effect the 
impact of the trust variable on the dependent variable. This suggests that the effect of trust 
can not be explained as an effect of time, as Williamson suggests. The formation of trust 
assessments thus appears to be independent from the length of time economic actors have 
been doing business together. 
Final comments: 
These findings are all the more interesting when we consider that the sales engineers at GC 
do not themselves set prices. As with most companies, GC has a "firewall" in place to 
prevent the sales agents from simply giving their friends deals. Prices are set by the product 
division managers, acting under the supervision of the director of GC's German sales 
division. However, these managers rely on the reports of their sales engineers, both written 
and verbal, in developing their understanding of the customers and setting prices. It is the 
sales engineers who constitute the actual human connection between GC and its customers. 
The sales engineers make the visits to the customer firms, and know the customers' and 
their needs personally. As Granovetter and others have suggested, these sales engineers are 
embedded in ongoing personal relations which directly impact the economic action of their 
firms. The sales engineers' relations with their contact persons at GC's customer firms 
drive their assessments of the trustworthiness of their trading partners, and these 
assessments in turn have an independent impact on price formation. For regardless of 
which equations I tested or how I set them up, the trust-S variable alone added eight to nine 
percent to the explained variance when it was included. 
Trust and Contracting: 
As tables 4a and 4b illustrate, my hypothesis that trust on both sides of the relation affects 
the type of contract used, is supported by the survey data. It is interesting to note that the 
trust the sales engineer has for the customer has a stronger effect on the type of contract 
used than the customer's trust assessment of the sales engineer. This is consistent with the 
interview data which suggests that the contracting decision is largely the supplier's decision. 
As informant, a purchasing manager at a middle-sized manufacturer of high pressure 
cleaning equipment, explained "Sometimes we might want a more detailed contract, with . 
delivery dates and maybe price discounts for errors and late deliveries if we can get it, but 
most of the time its the supplier who wants a contract, to hold us to the quantity we said 
we'd take." 
Table 4a: Level of Trust Supplier has for the Customer and Contract Usage 
Level of Trust 
Table 4b: Level of Trust Customer has for the Supplier and Contract Usage 
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This finding supports the hypotheses and findings of Stewart Macaulay and others who have 
found that firms engaged in business relations do not use contracts to govern their relations 
nearly as often as would be predicted by a neoclassical economic approach. Likewise, 
contrary to what Williamson suggests, trust does not appear to require contracts to form 
nor are contracts even associated with higher degrees of trust,,in fact the reverse is true, 
contracts are associated with a lack of trust. 
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Discussion 
My research has explored the l i i s  between social structure and economic behavior. In my 
research design, social structure has been evidenced through ties firms maintain with other 
economic actors in their environment. I theorized that these ties are constituted by people 
embedded in social relations which shape their roles and behavior, and I hypothesize that 
these ties have an independent effect on economic activity. In the preliminary analysis 
offered in this paper these effects have been clearly demonstrated. While the sunk costs 
associated with customer specific investments and the sales volume both have strong effects 
on price formation, it is clear that the assessments of the trustworthiness of the customers 
made by GC7s sales engineers are clearly related to the prices they charge their customers. 
And perhaps most striking and counter to what Williamson and others have suggested, 
when controlling for these trust assessments, the length of relation and length of personal 
relation have little or no'relation to the prices charged. In addition, the use of contracts has 
been found to be related to these trust assessments. This is not to suggest that there are not 
additional questions and unaddressed lines of inquiry suggested by this work. 
Probably the most glaring of these unanswered questions the reader would like to see 
answered concerns causal direction. Some readers might suggest that a cognitive 
dissonance effect may be involved whereby sales engineers come to believe that they trust 
those people they have given the best deals to, precisely in order to make sense of why 
these customers have been receiving such deals. However, while input from the sales 
engineers is crucial to the area sales managers in their setting of prices, the sales engineers 
most often don't know the overall pricelcost ratio being offered to their customers, as they 
do not have access to the full cost calculations. Longitudinal data is required in order to 
rule out such effects. The collection of such time series data in which individual relations 
can be followed and changes in trust assessments monitored over time, is planned as a 
critical portion of my continuing research study with this firm. 
However, the above problem notwithstanding, I believe that the qualitative data, backed up 
by the survey data, have illustrated that personal relations are the basis of trust, and that 
trust between economic actors does affect contracting decisions on both sides of the 
relation, decisions of which supplier to source from on the customer side, and most 
significant of all, what price to charge customers. 
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